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Abstract
Scientists appeal to models when explaining phenomena. Such explanations are often
dubbed model explanations or model-based explanations (short: ME). But what are the
precise conditions for ME? Are ME special explanations? In our paper, we first rebut two
definitions of ME and specify a more promising one. Based on this analysis, we single out
a related conception that is concerned with explanations that are induced from working
with a model. We call them ‘model-induced explanations’ (MIE). Second, we study
three paradigmatic cases of alleged ME. We argue that all of them are MIE, upon closer
examination. Third, we argue that this undermines the building consensus that model
explanations are special explanations that, e.g., challenge the factivity of explanation.
Instead, it suggests that what is special about models in science is the epistemology
behind how models induce explanations.
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1. Introduction
Models are frequently used in science. Some of them are used for merely exploratory
purposes (cf., e.g., Kennedy 2012; Rohwer, Rice 2013; Gelfert 2016, ch. 4.). For instance,
scientists construct models to calculate possible climate scenarios (see, e.g., Parker 2006;
Werndl, Steele 2016), and quite a few models in economics are used to explore the behavior
of ideal rational agents (see, e.g., Ma¨ki 2005; Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova, Northcott
2013; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Marchionni 2017).1 But scientists also appeal to models when
explaining phenomena. Philosophers typically describe this as explaining with the model
itself. For instance, Bokulich claims: “[...] [O]n my view, Bohr’s model [of atoms] does
genuinely explain the Balmer series [...]” (2011, p. 44). Strevens asks “[...] how to interpret
the ideal gas model, when it is proffered as an explanation of gases’ Boylean behavior,”
(2017, p. 38) and so forth. Such explanations are often dubbed model-based explanations
or model explanations (short: ME).
Prima facie, ME are different from more familiar kinds of explanation and thus demand
their own investigation. For example, ME play a crucial role for doubting the factivity of
scientific explanation (see, e.g., Batterman 2009; Wayne 2011; Bokulich 2011, Bokulich
2012; Kennedy 2012). Typically, models involve idealizations. Explanations with such
models seem to involve idealizations, too. As Wayne writes (2011, p. 831, our italics):
Explanation in physics relies essentially on idealizations (idealized models) of phys-
ical systems, and the explanations themselves contain false statements about both
the explanatorily relevant features of the physical system and the phenomenon to
be explained.
This would violate factivity requirements on explanation, such as Hempel’s require-
ment that “[t]he sentences constituting the explanans must be true” (1965, p. 248).2
But what are the precise conditions for ME? And are ME special explanations? In
what follows, we first clarify the notion of ME (sec. 2) through a critical discussion of
current accounts. Based on this analysis, we single out two different conceptions concern-
ing the role of models in explanation and argue that only one of them is concerned with
model explanation as a distinct kind of explanation. The other one is concerned with
explanations that are induced from working with a model. We call them ‘model-induced
1Examples for explorative functions of models are the following (cf. Rohwer, Rice 2016, pp. 1141-1144):
(i) Some models enable the modeler to view the phenomenon of interest from a novel perspective. (ii)
Some models function as aids to discovering the right kind of explanations needed for the phenomenon at
hand. (iii) Some models are used to justify important background beliefs for formulating an explanation.
2This challenge to a factive account of explanations has also been discussed by, e.g., Reiss 2012, Reiss
2013; Ma¨ki 2013; for a critical account see, e.g., van Riel 2017; Sullivan, Khalifa 2019.
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explanations’ (MIE). Second, we study three paradigmatic cases of alleged ME (sec. 3).
What are their explananda? What are their explanantia? We argue that all of them are
MIE — not ME — upon closer examination. Third, we argue that this undermines the
building consensus that model explanations are special explanations that, e.g., challenge
the factivity of explanation. Instead, it suggests that what is special about models in
science is the epistemology behind how models induce explanations (sec. 4).
2. Defining Model(-based) Explanation
Models are devices scientists typically employ for examining objects or phenomena. We
encounter them in many disciplines, including physics, chemistry, biology, psychology,
linguistics, and the social sciences. Models are usually accounts of their so-called target
objects or phenomena. But by their very nature, scientific models are not replicas or
complete representations of them. As Hughes emphasizes, “[t]o have a model [...] is
not to have a literally true account of the process or entity in question” (1990, p. 71).
Typically, one builds models to investigate particular features of the target phenomena.
Take the double helix model of DNA as a paradigmatic example. Its target object, i.e.
DNA, is modeled as having the form of a double helix. Using this model, one can explore
this structural feature of DNA.
Models are construed based on stipulations about the target objects. For instance, the
Ising model construes a macroscopic magnet as a collection of elementary magnets whose
orientation determines the overall magnetization. Not uncommonly, these stipulations
are idealizations. For instance, according to the optical Glauber model of atomic nuclei,
these nuclei are perfect spheres of energy. The nature of these idealized stipulations is
controversial (for an overview see, e.g., Weisberg 2007, Elliott-Graves, Weisberg 2014).
For example, it is debated whether good models need to feature idealizations that can
be de-idealized in the long run, whether some models involve indispensable idealizations,
etc. Our treatment of model explanation is orthogonal to this debate.
Whereas some models are comprised of a set of mathematical equations, many models
are not sentential entities. Models can also be materialized, e.g., the model of DNA can
be a physical entity.3 However, one can single out a model’s propositional content by
figuring out which propositions are true according to the model (see, e.g., Strevens 2013,
p. 510; van Riel 2015, van Riel 2017; similarly Reiss 2012, pp. 49-50; Rohwer, Rice 2016,
pp. 1129-1130). We can formulate the propositions that are true according to a model
independent of whether the model itself contains these propositions.4 For instance, one
3We do not consider the particularity of materialized models here. For an overview of different kinds
of models, see, e.g., Frigg, Hartmann 2012 or Gelfert 2016. One might also consider model organisms,
such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, to be models (cf. Gelfert 2016, pp. 2-3). They can be
considered a simplified form of the organisms in question.
4For an analysis of the nature of such according-to propositions, see, e.g., van Riel 2015.
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can state that, according to the double helix model, DNA has a helix structure, and that,
according to the Ising model, macroscopic magnets consist of a collection of elementary
magnets. We consider every proposition that can be singled out in that way as part of
the model’s propositional content.5 Let us emphasize that this proposal does not involve
the suggestion that models represent their target objects by virtue of their propositional
content. The topic of whether or how models represent their target objects is a topic in
its own right.6
As we saw before, the idea that models can explain phenomena is widespread. So,
what are model explanations (ME)? Generally speaking, an explanation is an answer
to a why-question or a how-question. For instance, one could cite a law together with
other crucial conditions to answer why an event occurred. Answers to questions are
standardly conceived as sets of propositions. The underlying assumption is that non-
propositional methods of answering questions (e.g., nodding) could be described in terms
of propositions. For instance, as Strevens emphasizes (Strevens (2013), p. 510), the content
of explanations using visual information could be expressed in terms of propositions. Not
everyone agrees here and perhaps there are good reasons to allow for genuinely non-
propositional explanations. But, in order to make progress on the question of model
explanation, we follow Rohwer and Rice’s (2016) lead and adopt the propositional account
of explanation as a working hypothesis. However, we take it that the central conclusions
drawn in this paper hold true even if we adopt a non-propositional account of explanation,
as we indicate below.
Since not every answer to a why- or how-question counts as an explanation, one has
to say more in order to define explanation. But this is not the agenda of our paper.
Instead of adopting a specific account of explanation, we take a pluralistic stance. We
do not presuppose that all explanations are causal. We include explanations that are
typically considered to be non-causal, such as explanations of the fact that nobody can
cross all of Ko¨nigsberg’s bridges exactly once (see, e.g., Pincock 2007; Lange 2013). In
order to talk more precisely about explanation, we assume, for the sake of this paper,
that explanations describe difference makers along the lines of Strevens’ kairetic account
(2008). Causal explanations describe phenomena and facts that make a causal difference
to the phenomenon to be explained. Other explanations might appeal to necessities to
explain the phenomenon (e.g., Lange 2013). And so forth. Again, nothing hinges on our
5One issue to be discussed is whether every proposition that is entailed by a proposition that is true
according to the model is also part of the model’s propositional content. We remain neutral here.
6There is much discussion about whether or how models can be considered a representation of their target
objects (for an overview see Frigg, Hartmann 2012; for particular accounts see, e.g., Hughes 1997; Bailer-
Jones 2003; Giere 2004; Elgin 2007; Sua´rez 2010; Downes 2011; Frigg, Nguyen 2018), whether models
are akin to fiction (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 2009; Frigg 2010; Toon 2012) or concerned with possibilities
(e.g., Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013), etc. However, as we argue below, these issues can be separated from dealing
with the nature of model(-based) explanations.
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choice of this explanatory framework. As we hope to make clear throughout the paper,
the issue of elucidating model explanation is not restricted to any specific conception of
explanation.7
So, what makes an explanation model-based or a model explanation (ME) specifically?
In the remainder of this section, we first consider two accounts of ME that are inspired
by Bokulich’s work (2011, 2012, 2017) and Rohwer and Rice’s work (2016), respectively.
We show that these accounts, as they stand, are too broad or too narrow. And we argue
that one related conception of model explanation picks out what we call model-induced
explanation rather than a distinct kind of explanation.
2.1. Model Explanation
The first definition of model explanation (ME) we consider is based on a series of papers
in which Bokulich prominently analyzes ME (2011, 2012, 2017). A basic idea is that
ME are explanations where “[...] the explanans in question makes essential reference
to a scientific model [...].” (2011, p. 38) Scientific models are “incomplete and idealized
descriptions” of a target system (2017, p. 104; 2011). Bokulich initially proposed that
the essential reference to a model consists in the counterfactual structure of the model
being isomorphic in the relevant respects to the counterfactual structure of the target
phenomenon (2011, p. 39):
More precisely, in order for a model M to explain a given phenomenon P, we require
that the counterfactual structure of M be isomorphic in the relevant respects to the
counterfactual structure of P.
So, Bokulich demands that the structural features of the model be (partially) isomor-
phic to the relevant structural features of the phenomenon to be explained.8 But in her
latest treatment of ME, Bokulich proposes a broader analysis (2017, p. 104):
Model-based explanations (or model explanations, for short) are explanations in
which the explanans appeal [sic] to certain properties or behaviors observed in an
idealized model or computer simulation as part of an explanation for why the (typ-
ically real-world) explanandum phenomenon exhibits the features that it does.
The first definition of ME that we consider is based on this broader analysis. Bokulich
adds two additional constraints on ME (2011, 2012): The model user is justified in using
the model (justification) and the model explains by capturing patterns of counterfactual
7For instance, all our arguments are compatible with a Woodwardian concept of explanation that focuses
on counterfactual dependence (e.g., Woodward 2003). This concept is used in the model explanation
literature by, e.g., Bokulich 2011, Bokulich 2012; Rice 2018, Rice 2019b.
8Fang develops a variant of Bokulich’s account according to which it suffices that the model user hypoth-
esizes that the counterfactual structures applies to the target phenomenon (Fang 2019). For a model
user based account of ME see also, e.g., Jebeile, Kennedy 2015.
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dependence that hold true for the phenomenon of interest (counterfactual dependence).
The justificatory step is concerned with applying the model to the phenomenon to be
explained. In addition, Bokulich argues that not just any model is explanatory. She dis-
cusses reductionist models in geomorphology that are constantly improved by eliminating
idealizations (2017, p. 116):
Here one tries to simulate the braided river in as much accurate detail and with as
many different processes included as is computationally feasible, and then tries to
solve the relevant Navier–Stokes equations in three dimensions. These reductionist
models are the best available tools for predicting the features of braided rivers, but
they are so complex that they yield very little insight into why the patterns emerge
as they do.
These models are still idealized in some sense (e.g., they might involve abstractions
and simplifications), but Bokulich denies that these models can explain. She argues that
heavily de-idealized models, due to their complexity, are unable to provide explanations
(or, for that matter, understanding). Heavily de-idealized models cannot give us the why
of phenomena. Thus, we should make explicit that Bokulich restricts model explanation
to what one could call substantially-idealized-model explanation.
Bokulich’s last two constraints (counterfactual dependence and substantially idealized
models) are concerned with what can explain phenomena. Since we want to stay as
neutral as possible in this regard, we don’t add them to the first definition of ME that we
discuss. Moreover, we take it that Bokulich’s justificatory step is part of what it means to
appeal to a model. Ensuring that one is justified in using the model for the phenomenon
in question strikes us as justifiably appealing to a model. We further assume that the
analysis of ME is meant to include properties or behaviors that define the model, e.g., a
modeling assumption that the population of interest is arbitrarily large. Such properties
or behaviors are arguably not observed. So, we put the first definition of ME that we
consider as follows:
Model explanation (Appeal): An explanation is a model explanation iff the explana-
tion justifiably appeals to properties or behaviors that define an idealized model or
are observed in it.
To illustrate such an appeal analysis of ME, Bokulich uses the example of explaining
why sparrows of a certain species vary in their feather coloration from pale to dark. With
the aid of a game theory model one can demonstrate that such a polymorphism can be
used as a stable and successful strategy to mark the status of the sparrows (which avoids
conflicts over resources). She then writes (2017, p. 104)
The model demonstrates that such a strategy is stable and successful, and hence
can be used as part of the explanation for why we find this polymorphism among
sparrows [...].
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We think that this a good illustration of ME Appeal. We have a model, we are justi-
fied in applying it to the phenomenon to be explained, and we end up with a successful
explanans because we used the model. However, this example also illustrates the main
issue with ME Appeal: It allows for the model’s content to not be contained in the ex-
planans. Take the example of the sparrows. The only reference to the game theory model
is that the model demonstrated the success of the polymorphism strategy. The fact that
the polymorphism strategy is successful is part of the explanation. But this polymor-
phism strategy (i.e., the variation in feather coloration) need not make any reference to
the model. Only the outcome of applying the game theory model — the demonstration of
the polymorphism strategy’s success and stability — is part of the explanation. In other
words, it is not the game theory model that explains but the polymorphism strategy.
Because the model’s content need not be part of the explanation, ME Appeal provides
us with too weak or too loose a connection between the model and the explanation to
account for ME. We need a stronger link.
We ultimately think that the explanations picked out by ME Appeal are part of what
we call model-induced explanation. But before we go into detail, let us turn to an analysis
that ensures a stronger connection between the model and the explanation.
Rohwer and Rice (2016), in asking how models and explanations are related, describe
an alternative account of model explanation. This account follows the rough slogan ‘The
model is the explanans.’ This slogan is understood as follows (2016, p. 1132, our italics):9
. . . the propositions that constitute the model are identical to the propositions that
constitute the explanation the modeler is interested in.
We call the propositions that constitute a model the model’s content. For the sake of
being inclusive, we assume that the model’s content is either its propositional content or
its representational10 content — whatever the latter is precisely. This gives us a second
pass at defining ME in terms of identity.
Model explanation (Identity): An explanation is a model explanation iff the model’s
content is identical to the explanation (or its explanans).11
The essence of ME Identity is not restricted to propositional contents. If there were
non-propositional explanations (and non-propositional model contents) and if one defined
what an identity between non-propositional contents is, ME Identity could have a non-
propositional variant.
9The account Rohwer and Rice describe seems to be in line with van Riel’s definition of ME as explanations
that are true according to a model (2017).
10It is controversial whether models represent their target phenomena (see fn. 6). But if so: The repre-
sentational content could be an explanation if it can be expressed in terms of propositions.
11In some cases of explanations of singular occurrences of phenomena, the model’s content might not
contain descriptions of the phenomenon itself.
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ME Identity seems to be a plausible explication of the common claim that models
can be explanations while being compatible with other accounts of ME (e.g., Craver
2006; Kaplan 2011). ME Identity also clearly goes beyond appealing to a model and
ensures a close relation between the model and the explanation. After all, the model’s
content is identical to the explanation. But straight away, this analysis raises at least two
challenging questions: (i) Is it compatible with heavily idealized models? (ii) Does the
identity thesis between model and explanation hold? What if the model contains more
or fewer propositions than are necessary for explaining the target phenomenon? In what
follows, we discuss each in turn.
One might worry that ME Identity is not compatible with heavily idealized models.
Can the content of heavily idealized models be identical to a correct explanation? This
worry seems to presuppose that correct explanations cannot be idealized. But it is a
substantial question whether they can. ME Identity as such is perfectly compatible with
heavily idealized models being ME. According to ME Identity, it only follows that the
explanations would be idealized, too.12
The main question concerning ME Identity is, assuming that we have the right con-
ception of a model’s content: Does the identity thesis between model and explanation
presumed by ME Identity hold? To begin, Rohwer and Rice straightforwardly accept
that a model may have more propositions than is necessary for explaining a target sys-
tem. At least in some cases, the explanation still contains all those extra propositions.
This makes the explanation a worse one, but the explanation is still a model explanation
(cf. Rohwer, Rice 2016, p. 1133). For instance, a causal model explanation that cites more
facts than necessary to explain the phenomenon of interest is not as good as it could be
because it does not only focus on the factors that made a difference. The explainer would
do better to choose a model without extraneous propositions needed to explain.
An exception is made for idealized models. Idealized models, on their view, contain
idealizations that are not necessary for explaining the phenomenon, but are neverthe-
less part of the model and the explanation. Examples are cases where idealizations are
ineliminable, or idealizations that could be replaced with another idealization without
explanatory loss (Rohwer, Rice 2016, pp. 1134-1137). This move concerning idealizations
is made precisely because Rohwer and Rice want to hold on to (i) the claim that only
true propositions can explain (which ME Identity does not presuppose), (ii) the claim
that idealized ME can be good explanations, and (iii) their identity analysis of ME. False
idealizations are extra propositions of the model that are part of the explanation, but the
12For a similar reason, we think that it is misleading to call such an analysis of model explanation a ‘rep-
resentationalist account of model explanation’ (cf. Kennedy 2012; Jebeile, Kennedy 2015; Fang 2019).
The basic idea of a representationalist account is that the model accurately represents the phenomena
of interest (or at least a substantial part thereof). However, ME Identity is not concerned with accurate
or complete representation. Moreover, what Kennedy proposes as a ‘non-representationalist account of
model explanation’ picks out model-induced explanations, as we argue further below.
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success of the explanation only depends on the true propositions. Moreover, when the
idealizations are ineliminable, there is no option to find an alternative model to explain
with.
Take as an example their analysis of Chris Pincock’s case of the ‘deep water’ ide-
alization (2012, 2014). This idealization postulates that the ocean is infinitely deep in
order to model why regular wave patterns occur after irregular patterns of disturbance.
The model contains the false proposition: (p1) the ocean is infinitely deep. Rohwer and
Rice (2016, p. 1136) then argue that in order for the model’s propositional content to be
an explanation, the model must also contain a second, reinterpreted proposition, that is
true—(p2) the depth of the ocean is above the threshold such that its particular value
does not matter—in order to explain the wave patterns of interest. There is a problem
here. Rohwer and Rice want to stay true to modeling practices, but the reinterpretation
strategy combined with ME Identity places a demand on modelers to (artificially) include
propositions in their model that are reinterpretations of the idealizations they employ.
According to ME Identity, the model’s content is identical to the explanation. So, to
obtain the explanation using the reinterpretation strategy we need to change the model’s
content. But modelers typically don’t change their models even when they know that the
idealizations are not correct. They often knew this when they constructed the models. An
analysis of ME should do well to capture actual modeling practices and not define ME in
a way that excludes idealized models where the modeler does not do an interpretive step
with their idealizations. The more inclusive reading of the deep water case (and what we
suspect more closely resembles modeling practices) is that while the explanation might
include (p2), the model need not.
What if there are cases where the model’s propositional content has fewer propositions
than the explananation? ME Identity excludes cases where the explanans additionally
involves propositions that are not true according to the model or just absent from the
model’s content from being full-fledged explanations. Such cases are only partial model
explanations (Rohwer, Rice 2016, pp. 1138-1139). The model is necessary for the explana-
tion, but it is not sufficient. This is a problem. According to our argument above, the case
of the deep water model is arguably such a case where there are fewer propositions in the
model than the explanation (if we reject the reinterpretive move), and we should want to
include it as an instance of ME. Moreover, all cases where the explanation includes real-
world features that are crucial for the explanation but not true according to the model
are also plausible candidates for ME. Models are selective. Models do not always specify
all aspects of target systems that explainers are interested in, but nevertheless the model
aids in the explanation, and the explanation shares some of the model’s content. On the
one hand, it is too narrow a conception of ME to say that such explanations are not
model explanations. After all, the explanation shares a crucial portion with the model’s
propositional content. On the other hand, in order for a partial model explanation to
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count as ME we need additional constraints. Otherwise, we are back to the worry that
the analysis is too broad, rendering too many explanations ME.
Our proposal is not to abandon ME Identity, but to revise it such that it avoids some
of the aforementioned problems. We restrict the identity criterion to allow for cases where
the model has more propositions than the explanation (or explanans) and cases where the
explanation has more propositions than the model. Our main proposal is to focus on the
core of the model’s content, on the one hand, and on the core of the explanation, on the
other hand. We have ME when the model’s content or its core13 is identical to the core
part of the explanation:
Model explanation (Core): An explanation is a model explanation iff the model’s core
content is identical to the core of the explanation.14
According to ME Core, the model’s core content must be identical to the explanation’s
core in order for the explanation to be a model explanation. One might wonder about
a case where the model’s core content contains the core of the explanation but is not
identical to it. Our definition excludes such cases and we think rightly so. Allowing
for such cases would render the definition too broad. Then one could construct model
explanations by creating rather arbitrary models with cores that involve the explanation’s
propositions but also many irrelevant other ones. A close connection between the model
and the explanation is then lost.
A lot hinges in our definition on what constitutes an explanation’s core. In this paper,
we don’t offer a full account of the core of an explanation or model. However, there
are some general intuitive principles that are helpful here and can serve to motivate the
remaining discussion in the paper.
First, consider the core of the explanation. What constitutes the core of the expla-
nation depends on the kind of explanation. In the case of a law-based explanation, the
citation of the law and the law’s application conditions are arguably the core of the ex-
planation. In the case of a mechanistic explanation, the description of crucial parts of
the mechanism constitute the explanation’s core. Second, we cannot simply define the
core in terms of the sheer amount of propositions. A law-based explanation might only
consists of a few propositions. Third, there needs to be a non-trivial relationship between
the propositions in question and the explanatory power of the explanation. While certain
boundary conditions might be necessary for entailing the explanandum, it is not central
13Recall that the propositional content of a model might include all the entailed propositions, as well (cf.
footnote 5).
14ME Core and ME Identity are concerned with the case of a single model. In cases where one explains
a phenomenon using multiple models at the same time, one would need to revise the definition such
that a conjunction of the models’ core contents is identical to the core of the explanation. (Note that
multi-scalar models with inconsistent sub-model assumptions typically explain different aspects of a
larger phenomenon and thus do not provide a joint explanation.)
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to the explanatory power of the explanation. For example, Sullivan (2019) argues that in
order to delineate a causal explanation from a non-causal explanation, one must identify
the ‘primary reason’ an explanation succeeds, and that boundary conditions are unlikely
candidates. This sense of explanatory importance is what we mean by the core. For ex-
ample, in a causal-mechanistic explanation of an event, the causal mechanism is the core
of the explanation with the peculiarities of the event in question being in the periphery.
Fourth, when we move to whether an explanation is a model explanation, we need to
see whether the core propositions of the explanation play a non-trivial role in the model
that the explanation refers to. Specifically, we want to exclude the possibility that an
explanation is a model explanation simply in virtue of relying on a generic proposition
that also just happens to be true of many other models. For example, many optimality
models in biology rely on infinitely-sized populations. However, if a given explanation
includes this idealization it is not thereby based on all possible optimality models or on
all models that assume infinitely-sized populations. It is not just that the proposition in
the explanation must play a crucial role in its explanatory power, but the same proposition
must be central to the model in question. It needs to be a proposition that is entrenched
with the other propositions of the model in such a way that it is recognizably doing real
work in the model, e.g., the proposition uniquely discriminates the model in question, and
cannot be easily separated. ME Core captures the deep water case without arbitrarily
stipulating whether interpretive idealizations are or are not part of a model.
Fifth, the notion of a model’s core might be illuminated with so-called robustness
analysis.15 Roughly speaking, this is the study of similar, but distinct, models of the
same target phenomenon. The basic idea is that if such models lead to similar results, we
can “... separate the scientifically important parts and predictions of our models from the
illusory ones that are accidents of representations,” as Weisberg puts it (2006, p. 731). For
instance, Woodward highlights that robustness analysis might lead to identifying casual
relationships which are stable or invariant under changes (2006, p. 235). The elements
of the model that are robust or stable are arguably an element of the model’s core.
And the ‘illusory ones’ would be part of the model’s periphery. Kuorikoski, Lehtinen,
and Marchionni add further considerations about how to distinguish between the core
of a model and its periphery (2010). They separate what they call substantial model
assumptions from assumptions that idealize “... away the influence of the confounding
factors ...” (2010, p. 547) and assumptions that need to be added to render the model
mathematically tractable. The latter two kinds of assumptions could be described as the
model’s periphery. But whether models can be decomposed in that way is controversial
(see, e.g., Rice 2019a). Either way, robustness analysis can contribute to sharpening the
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. For details on robustness analysis, see, e.g., Wim-
satt 1981; Orzack, Sober 1993; Levins 1966; Weisberg 2006; Woodward 2006; Kuorikoski, Marchionni
2010; for a critical view see, e.g., Odenbaugh, Alexandrova 2011.
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notion of a model’s core.
Now that we have a more promising definition of ME, we can go back to the thesis that
Bokulich’s analysis might not be concerned with model explanation but with a related
conception of models and explanations.
2.2. Model-induced Explanation
When it comes to scientific models, an important relation is what Rohwer and Rice call
an epistemological relation between a modeler, a model, and an explanation (2016, sect.
3). For instance, they describe cases where models are aids to discovering explanations
by helping to identify the kind of explanation needed for the phenomenon of interest
(ibid.). In what follows, we argue that several conceptions of model explanation pick out
a particular kind of epistemological relation rather than a distinct kind of explanation,
namely what we call inducing explanation. We call the explanations that feature this
relation model-induced explanations (MIE).
As we argued above, ME Appeal is too weak or too loose a definition of model ex-
planation. However, ME Appeal captures an important aspect of many explanations
discussed in the literature: The cases that drive the debate are concerned with models
that seem to be epistemically crucial to the explanation. In contrast to merely using
a model as a tool to look for the right (kind of) explanation of the phenomenon of in-
terest (a case discussed by Rohwer, Rice 2016, p. 1141), the models of interest play an
enabling role. Without using the model, the explanation would have not been discov-
ered.16 So, the models play a crucial role in the process of obtaining the explanations (see
also Lawler 2019). We focused above on Bokulich’s proposal, but this conception of model
explanation is visible throughout the literature.17 Take, for example, Graham Kennedy’s
‘non-representationalist’ account of model explanation (Kennedy 2012, pp. 331-332, see
also Jebeile, Kennedy 2015):
Comparison cases explain by allowing model users to identify those factors which
make a difference to the behavior of the modeled target system. [...] This type
of explanation occurs with many scientific models. [...] In cases where the actual
value of a variable is known, a non actual or false value can be used to generate
a comparison with the more realistic case. In cases where the actual value of a
component is not known, two non actual limiting comparison cases can be used
to encompass the (unknown) actual value. These comparison cases allow the user
16As one reviewer remarked, another interesting epistemic role might be the role of models in justifying
the explanations of interest. Discussing the relation between justification and models is a topic in its
own right. We don’t discuss it here.
17Marchionni, for example, describes conceptions of ME as being between two opposite sides of a contin-
uum (cf. Marchionni 2017, p. 609). We think that they are better described as two different conceptions
for the reasons given in what follows.
11
to learn about the behavior and/or evolution of the phenomenon in question, and
thereby to explain components of the target system being modeled.
What Graham Kennedy’s and Bokulich’s analyses have in common is that the rela-
tion between the explanation and the model is located in the process of obtaining the
explanation. The model is claimed to play an important (if not even an essential) role
in that process. The game theory model establishes the success of the polymorphism,
which can then be used to explain the why of the variation in feather coloration. When
Kennedy argues for her ‘non-representationalist’ account of model explanation, she also
emphasizes this role of the model. She describes two astrophysics models which help the
model user to arrive at the explanation of interest by functioning as a comparison case
for the phenomenon at hand. Graham Kennedy writes (2012, p. 331):
The simplified two-dimensional models are themselves required for explanation be-
cause they enable the scientists to identify which factors make a causal difference
to the evolution of the disks.
Let us suppose that she is right about her case studies. Let us suppose that the
models are required for the desired explanation. Even if that were true, this does not
mean that the model itself explains the phenomenon of interest. The claim that the
model is required for obtaining the explanation is merely a claim about how one arrives
at the explanation. This claim is compatible with the explanans not making any reference
to the model. For instance, in Kennedy’s example the models help to identify the causal
difference makers for the evolution of the disks. But only the latter need to be cited in the
resulting explanations. So, Graham Kennedy’s ‘non-representationalist’ account of model
explanation turns out to be not about model explanation. Instead, this account is better
described to be about what we call model-induced explanation. The resulting explanation
is closely related to the model because working with the model opens up new epistemic
perspectives. The explanation is induced by working with the model. Graham Kennedy
hints at this epistemic function when she writes (2012, p. 327, italics omitted):
I propose that, in many cases, the idealizations within scientific models play a more
active explanatory role, by allowing scientists to determine what is causally relevant.
And in a later paper with Jebeile she claims (2015, p. 384):
[...] idealizations [in models] should be seen as having an active role in making
possible the identification of explanatory components in models.
This enabling function is crucial and should not be neglected. But it is important
not to conflate it with the results of utilizing it (i.e., the obtained explanations) (see also
Lawler 2019). Elgin describes this function of models (and of idealized scientific devices
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more generally) as providing epistemic access to the phenomenon of interest: “Each
model exemplifies different features and affords epistemic access to different aspects of
the target.” (2017, p. 267) So, different models open up different epistemic perspectives
on the phenomenon. Constructing and working with the model highlights aspects of the
phenomenon that are otherwise difficult to examine or describe. One plausible reading of
what Graham Kennedy describes is that she illustrates an instance of this general function
highlighted by Elgin. Also, other claims about model explanation can plausibly be read
as claims about model-induced explanation. Take as an example Rice’s analysis of how
idealized models can explain. He writes (2018, p. 2803, our italics):
Only by pervasively distorting the features of real-world systems can physicists apply
the mathematical modeling techniques required to provide epistemic access to the
explanations we seek.
This case sounds like a paradigmatic case of a model-induced explanation.
It goes without saying that this relation between models and explanations is an inter-
esting one. However, it is important to flag that it as a largely epistemic one. The model
plays no more or less than an important role in what one might want to call the discov-
ery of the explanation in question. One should not conflate this enabling role of models
with model explanation. The mere epistemic role of models falls short of philosophers’
ambitions when they discuss model explanation. In order to keep track of the difference
between these two conceptions, we define ‘model-induced explanation’ (MIE) as follows:18
Model-induced explanation: An explanation is model-induced iff constructing or us-
ing the model constitutes a decisive part of arriving at the explanation.
Model explanation (Core): An explanation is a model explanation iff the model’s core
content is identical to the core of the explanation.
To illustrate the importance of this distinction, take Morrison’s claim about what
makes models explanatory (1999, p. 63):
The reason models are explanatory is that in representing these systems, they ex-
hibit certain kinds of structural dependencies.
18This distinction is roughly related to Rohwer and Rice’s proposal to draw “[...] a distinction between
a model being a stand-alone explanation [model explanation] versus merely being explanatory [model-
induced explanation]” (2013, p. 335). But their notion of an ‘explanatory model’ is much weaker than
our notion of a model-induced explanation. According to them, “[a]n explanatory model is one that
produces scientific understanding relevant to answering a why question [...]” (2013, p. 335). By contrast,
we demand that the results of working with the model are parts of the answers to the why-question
and that using the model is decisive for obtaining the answers.
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Her claim can mean substantially different things. Exhibiting structural dependencies
does not mean that these are identical to the dependencies cited in the respective explana-
natia; they could merely point to them. If Morrison only requires that the dependencies
exhibited by the model have this pointing function, she is concerned with model-induced
explanation. If, instead, she requested the isomorphism relation, she would be concerned
with model explanation.
In what follows, we analyze paradigmatic cases of (alleged) model explanation in the
literature to examine whether they are ME or merely MIE.
3. Paradigmatic cases: Bees, Fluids, and Rainbows
There are at least three kinds of models that are frequently discussed in the literature
on scientific models and explanations: optimality models, phase-transition models in-
volving the thermodynamic limit, and models that are analyzed as fictions rather than
idealizations. For each kind, we analyze one paradigmatic case that is claimed to pro-
vide explanations: models for explaining the honeybee foraging behavior (used in Rice
2016), lattice gas models for explaining patterns of fluid flow (used in Batterman, Rice
2014; Rice 2018), and models for explaining supernumerary arcs of rainbows (used in
Batterman 2005; Pincock 2011; Saatsi (forthcoming)).
In this section, we ask whether these paradigmatic cases are genuine instances of
ME. Our guiding questions in what follows are (a) What is explained, i.e., what is the
explanandum-phenomenon? (b) What is the explanation? (c) How does the model figure
into the latter?19 The upshot of our analyses is that the alleged ME turn out to be
MIE. As we argue in the next section, this fact undermines the building consensus that
model explanations are special explanations that, e.g., challenge our standard concepts of
explanation.
3.1. Bees
In the realm of biology, so-called optimality or optimization models are frequently used
(cf. Rice 2012, Rice 2018, sect. 3.2; Elgin, Sober 2002, pp. 446-448; Potochnik 2007,
Potochnik 2009, Potochnik 2010; Bokulich 2017, pp. 104-105).20 These are models that
highly idealize their target objects or phenomena. As Rice puts it (2018, p. 2808),
19A brief methodological remark: Philosophers when discussing idealized models often assume that sci-
entists actually succeed in doing what they claim they do. In particular, they take for granted that
scientists correctly explain with at least some models (cf., e.g., Wayne 2011, pp. 831-832; Rice 2018,
p. 2799). In this paper, we do not discuss whether this assumption is apt. Instead, we evaluate a
conditional question: If scientists provide us with correct explanations: How do the models figure into
such explanations?
20Optimization models are also used in other disciplines, as Rice points out (Rice 2018, p. 2803).
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[such models] [...] pervasively misrepresent the features and processes of their target
system(s), including those that are assumed to be the difference makers for the target
explanandum [phenomenon].
The basic goal of optimality models is to analyze why particular phenotypic traits
occur. They do so by determining optimal strategies for obtaining particular features,
such as the net energy intake given a set of limiting factors and trade-offs such as the costs
of finding or consuming food. In order to determine the optimal strategy, such models
don’t simply involve some distorting idealizations; they involve distorting idealizations for
the most part. An example Rice gives is a model of the foraging behavior of honey bees
(as presented in Schmid-Hempel et al. 1985). It is assumed, among other things, that the
honey bee population is arbitrarily large, that there is no intergenerational overlap, that
the selection pressure in the honey bee population remains constant, etc. (cf. Rice 2016,
p. 89). In short, there are barely any propositions that are true according to the model
that are actually true. Moreover, as in the case of any optimality model, it is assumed that
natural selection is the only evolutionary factor that matters for the phenotypic trait’s
evolution.
How can biologist explain with such a model? In the honey bee example, the explanan-
dum-phenomenon is the fact that honey bees tend to leave food sources when their crops
(i.e., their honey sacks/stomachs) are only partially filled. This is a puzzling fact because
one would expect them to fill it completely (or at least as much as possible). The ex-
planation for this behavior is that the honey bees maximize their energy efficiency rather
than the rate of energy intake (cf. Rice 2016, p. 89). The foraging pattern seems to be
an adaptive response to a trade-off between energy efficiency maximization and energy
intake rate maximization. Visiting more food sources would reduce their energy efficiency.
That is why honey bees leave them when their energy intake is high enough.
How does the model figure into the latter? The core of the explanation is constituted
by the trade-off claim. This claim, in turn, is the result of the above described optimality
model, according to which the honey bees maximize their energy efficiency (cf. Rice 2016;
Schmid-Hempel et al. 1985). The patterns that this model predicts are very similar to the
patterns observed for the real-world honey bees’ foraging behavior. Alternative models
did not reproduce these patterns. So, it seems that the model’s stipulation that honey
bees maximize their energy efficiency is correct. The model seems to capture correctly
this fact of the foraging behavior.
The model seems to be essential for the explanation (at least at that time). It is the
one that produces the observed patterns. It is also true that the trade-off claim is part
of the model’s content. After all, this claim is true according to the model. So, it looks
as if the explanation is a ME. However, let us not jump to a conclusion here. Recall our
analysis of ME:
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Model explanation (Core): An explanation is a model explanation iff the model’s core
content is identical to the core of the explanation.
The condition for ME is not fulfilled, upon closer examination. As Rice argues in
detail (2016, 2018), the model’s trade-off claim cannot be quarantined from the ideal-
ized stipulations mentioned above, such as the claim that the honey bee population is
arbitrarily large. Only the stipulations taken together have that claim as a result. So,
arguably the core of the model ’s content contains at least a substantial amount of these
stipulations; the core is not just constituted by the trade-off claim. Importantly, none of
these idealized stipulations are part of the explanation; only the trade-off claim is. The
explanation does not involve the assumptions that the honey bee population is arbitrarily
large or that there is no intergenerational overlap. At best, the explanation and the model
both involve the claim that evolution leads to traits that maximize energy efficiency.21
But that would not render it a ME. The model’s core content is not identical to the core
of the explanation. The core of the model, but not the explanation, involves the crucial
idealizations. If so, the honey bee case is not a case of a ME. The model itself does not
explain the honey bees’ foraging behavior.
The honey bee case can, however, be analyzed as a MIE, i.e., a model-induced explana-
tion. Constructing the energy maximization model constituted a decisive part of arriving
at the trade-off claim. The model induced the explanation, so to speak. It played a
substantial role in arriving at the explanation.
3.2. Fluids
In physics, we also encounter idealized models, such as models involving the thermo-
dynamic limit. “This widely used modeling assumption is the limit in which (roughly
speaking) the number of particles of the system approaches infinity,” as Rice puts it
(2018, pp. 2800-2801). The volume of the system is assumed to go to infinity, as well.
Models that employ the n → ∞ assumption and the V → ∞ assumption are so-called
phase-transition models. Phase transitions are abrupt changes of the qualitative macro-
scopic properties of a system or substance, such as water’s freezing into ice, the transition
from liquid to gas, or the magnetization of iron. The thermodynamic limit is claimed
to be essential for such models because the phenomenon of a phase transition cannot be
produced with a model that assumes finite particles. We cannot model phase transitions
by employing finite systems, say, systems based on statistical mechanics.22 So, it seems
21We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
22There is a debate about the thermodynamic limit in philosophy of physics. Some argue that it is
dispensable (e.g., Butterfield 2011; Norton 2012; for an overview see, e.g., Shech 2017). For some useful
discussion see also, e.g., Shech 2013; Feintzeig 2017. For the sake of argument, we take for granted here
that the thermodynamic limit is necessary.
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that we cannot explore phase transitions without taking for granted the thermodynamic
limit. Such models are hence a promising candidate for ME.
An example of models that employ the thermodynamic limit are particular lattice gas
automaton models that model fluid flow. These models not only employ the thermo-
dynamic limit but also involve several other distorting idealizations. According to such
models, fluids consist of point particles that could move in just six directions and only on
a hexagonal lattice. Despite these utterly false assumptions, an application of a lattice
gas automaton model reproduces macroscopic behaviors of real-world fluids to a relevant
degree of similarity (for details see, e.g., Batterman, Rice 2014; Rice 2018).
So, how can we explain with such a model? In the fluid flow example, the explanandum-
phenomenon is the fact that the momentum density profile in a pipe is parabolic. Batter-
man and Rice propose that this fact can be explained by the patterns resulting from the
lattice gas automaton model (2014). Their basic idea is that such a ‘model explanation’
is possible when the use of the model’s idealizations can be justified (2014, 2018). As Rice
puts it (2018, p. 2796, our italics):
[...] [H]ow can models that provide holistically distorted representations explain?
In order to answer this question, I will propose an alternative method for justifying
scientists’ use of idealized models to explain [...].
The idea that justification plays an important role for ME is also advocated by
Bokulich (2011), as we mentioned before. According to her, the justification consists
of specifying the domain of applicability of the model and to show that the phenomenon
to be explained falls within that domain (ibid.). Rice and Batterman’s proposal differs
from that. The basic idea is as follows (2018, p. 2796):
[...] I will propose an alternative method for justifying scientists’ use of idealized
models to explain that appeals to universality : the fact that systems with (perhaps
very) different physical features will display similar patterns of macroscale behavior.
So, their proposal is that we are justified in using the lattice gas automaton model
because it and the fluid are in the same universality class (2014, 2018; 2009, pp. 437-438).
Universality is the fact that very different systems display highly similar macrobehaviors
despite their differences. One example for this are phase transitions. Very different enti-
ties, such as fluids and ferromagnets, can undergo phase transitions that are remarkably
similar in their features.23
So, why is universality considered to show us how models can explain something? The
idea is as follows. First, we have to establish an appropriate link between the results of
the idealized model and the real-world phenomenon of interest, e.g., a link between phase
23The same holds true for certain models in biology (cf. Batterman, Rice 2014, sec. 4, Rice 2018, p. 2802).
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transitions that result from the model application and the real-world phase transitions.
The link is that the idealized model and the real-world physical system are in the same
universality class (Rice 2018, p. 2812).
Second, that the real-world system and the idealized system are in the same univer-
sality class suggests that “[...] the stability of such macobehaviors [sic] is due to the
fact that the features [...] are largely independent of the details of the components or
dynamical processes that operate in the system” (Rice 2018, p. 2813, italics omitted). In
other words, we can conclude that “[...] many of the details that distinguish the physical
systems from one another are irrelevant for their universal behavior [...]” (Batterman
2002, p. 42). This shall give us a good enough reason to believe that genuine idealized
models are explanatory. As Batterman and Rice put it (Batterman, Rice 2014, p. 356):
The models are explanatory in virtue of there being a story about why large classes
of features are irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon.
Or as Rice puts it (2018, p. 2816):
[...] [T]he reason these idealized models are able to explain is that, as long as the
system is within the relevant universality class, most of the physical details of the
system are irrelevant for the occurrence of certain universal macrobehaviors.
Yet, this cannot be the whole story. That some features are irrelevant does not explain
the phenomenon of interest. In his 2018 paper, Rice indeed limits his claim about the
role of universality to the claim that appealing to universality can justify the use of
idealized models to explain phenomena (2018). However, Batterman and Rice make
further statements about in virtue of what facts they consider genuine idealized models
to be explanatory. They put it as follows (2014, p. 363):
A derivative, or by-product, of this [universality] analysis is the identification of the
shared features of the class of systems. In this case, the by-product is a realization
that all the systems within the universality class share the common features locality,
conservation, and symmetry. [...] This answers [the] question [‘Why do very different
fluids have features, such as symmetry, in common?’] and provides, given the answer
to [the question ‘Why are the heterogeneous details irrelevant for the occurrence
of the phenomenon?’], an answer to [the question ‘Why are the common features
necessary for the phenomenon to occur?’].
Let us suppose they are right. The argument from universality then gives us the
following:
(i) The fact that the model and its target system are in the same universality class
justifies using the former to explore the latter.
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(ii) The fact that different kinds of real-world systems are in the same universality class
explains why their “[....] patterns occur across such varied physical system [sic]”
(Rice 2018, p. 2802).
(iii) The fact that different kinds of real-world systems are in the same universality class
explains why they share some features.
(iv) The fact that different kinds of real-world systems are in the same universality class
explains why the common features of systems in a universality class are necessary
for the pattern of interest to occur.
It goes without saying that these are important results. However, none of them in
isolation or taken together gives us the desired explanation or justifies treating the models
as providing us with ME. Recall that the explananda of interest are facts like the fact
that the momentum density profile in a pipe is parabolic or other facts about features of
fluids, liquids, etc. Neither (i), (ii), (iii), nor (iv), nor a combination of (i)-(iv) explains
these facts.
Take (i): We gladly accept that the idealized model being in the same universality
class as the system to be explained justifies the exploration of the latter with the former.
However, this only justifies the use of the idealized model. It does not give us any
explanation yet or show that the model’s core is identical to the explanation’s core.
(ii) might give us an explanation. But (ii) is at best an explanation for the question
‘Why do similar patterns occur across different fluids?’24 On the one hand, this question is
substantially different from the question of interest, namely, say, ‘Why is the momentum
density profile in a pipe parabolic?’ On the other hand, the resulting explanation is clearly
not a ME. The explanation is that all the different fluids are in the same universality class.
Such an explanation contains no reference to a model in any interesting sense. The same
holds true for (iii). Indeed, being in the same universality class might be relevant for
explaining the commonalities of features. But this answers the question ‘Why do very
different fluids share features X, Y, Z?’ and not the questions of interest and it doesn’t
seem to involve the model ’s content.25
We are somewhat skeptical that the argument from universality gives us (iv). But even
if it does, no ME is obtained. (iv) addresses the question ‘Why are the common features
necessary for the phenomenon to occur?’ This is an interesting question and an answer
to it might constitute part of an explanation for why the pattern of interest occurs. But,
24(ii) might also give us a good reason to believe that we only need one explanation for the variety of
the systems which exhibit the pattern.
25Batterman and Rice also suggest that we can explain particular behaviors of fluids by pointing out that
the fluids are in a particular universality class where all members exhibit these behaviors (Batterman,
Rice 2014, p. 364). But, again, the explanatory information is the membership in the universality class
and not some model information.
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on the one hand, this does not suffice for ME. It does not give us the core of the desired
explanation. The latter arguably consists of more than a list of some necessary features.
On the other hand, these necessary features themselves do not make a reference to the
model. They seem to be independent of the model. So, (iv) does not give us ME, either.
What about a combination of (i)-(iv)? (i) is merely concerned with the justificatory
step. (ii) and (iii) have closely related explananda. (ii) might answer ‘Why do similar
patterns occur across different fluids?’ and (iii) might answer ‘Why do very different fluids
share features X, Y, Z?’ The combined answer can be further connected with the result of
(iv), namely that the common features of systems in a universality class are necessary for
the pattern of interest to occur. Recall that our question of interest is a question like ‘Why
is the momentum density profile in a pipe parabolic?’ (ii)-(iv) taken together also don’t
provide us with a ME. Only knowing of necessary conditions of the momentum density
profile and knowing that these conditions are shared with systems in the same universality
class doesn’t give us a full explanation. But let us suppose that they do or that they can
be combined with other information to arrive at a full explanation. Even if so, it has
only been established that the explanatory decisive information is the membership in the
universality class. We don’t have evidence that the model’s core content is identical to
the explanation’s core.
So, none of the explanatory virtues of universality seems to lead to ME. However,
models featuring the thermodynamic limit can clearly provide us with model-induced
explanations. In fact, we think that Batterman and Rice’s analyses are best construed as
analyses of MIE. Consider how Rice substantiates the universality claim. He illustrates it
by means of the example of the discovery that melt ponds are in these same universality
class as other systems that undergo phase transitions. He concludes (2018, p. 2816, our
italics):
[...] by discovering that these melt ponds are in the same universality class as
other physical (and model) systems, these modelers were able to apply vari-
ous mathematical modeling tools (e.g. homogenization) to extract explanatory
information about real-world systems without having to accurately represent
the entities, processes, or ontology of those systems. In this way, these mathe-
matical modeling techniques enabled access to explanations and understanding
that would otherwise have been inaccessible.
These extracting and epistemic access functions are at the heart of MIE. One extracts
explanatory information by working with the model and one gains epistemic access to
explanations. Moreover, the claim that—by means of universality—one can identify which
features are necessary for the phenomenon to occur also fits the conception of MIE better
than the conception of ME. Hence, we think it is safe to conclude that one can obtain
MIE with the aid of universality but not ME.
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3.3. Rainbows
Lastly, consider a candidate of ME that involves, in Bokulich’s terminology (2012), an
explanatory fiction: An explanation of the supernumerary arcs of rainbows. In cases where
light waves moving through the raindrop exhibit constructive and destructive interference,
extra bands of color can form inside the primary rainbow, with some space between the
primary bow and the extra bands. These extra bands are supernumeraries.
The best explanation of why supernumeraries form requires reference to features of the
wave theory of light and the fictitious ray theory (Batterman 2002; Pincock 2011; Saatsi
forthcoming). Saying the best explanation here is not accidental. There are more complex
computational models that also capture supernumeraries without appealing to light rays.
In particular, the Lorenz-Mie model is able to capture the phenomenon utilizing electro-
magnetic theory. However, just as Bokulich is skeptical that the hyper-realistic models
of braided rivers are explanatory, since they fail to provide the why, so too Batterman
(2002), Pincock (2011), and Saatsi (forthcoming) argue that the Lorenz-Mie model fails
to provide us with the why of supernumeraries. Instead, it is argued, the complex angular
momentum approach (CAM), which utilizes the fiction of light rays, provides us with the
best explanation.
Following Pincock (2011), the size of β—a dimensionless parameter that is the prod-
uct of the wavelength number, k (2pi/wavelength), and the radius of the raindrop, a—
determines the rainbow patterns that emerge. For example, if β is too small, then a
rainbow is not observed, or certain colors may be distorted. The ray representation re-
sults from the wave representation when β →∞. In this case, the wave-theoretic aspects
of the light are not relevant to trace the path of the light through the raindrop. In other
words, when the wavelength of light is much smaller than the radius of the raindrop, the
dominant contributions to the light begin to approach the behavior of rays instead of
waves (2011, p. 19). Importantly Pincock (2011, p. 16) notes that:
we do not represent the wave crests as forming a continuous straight line, but only
claim that the distance between crests is so small with respect to the radius of the
drops that it is not relevant to the path of the wave.
This means the ray theory helps to give a useful frame for understanding light’s behav-
ior, even though the ray theory ignores key aspects of the characteristics of light, such as
the way that light is diffracted by a sphere. Interestingly, in explaining supernumeraries,
one needs to incorporate the interference and diffraction effects provided by the wave-
theory, while also incorporating the ray-theoretic representation. In particular, the CAM
method provides a “rapidly converging expression in terms of ‘poles’ and ‘saddle points’
in a complex-valued angular momentum space, representing the main contributions to the
scattering amplitude at the primary rainbow angle” (Saatsi forthcoming, p. 12). Saddle
points occur where the first derivative of the scattering amplitudes S with respect to λ
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(the angular momenta of the components of the light that hits the drop) is 0. Poles, on
the other hand, occur where S lacks a derivative of some order (Pincock 2011, p. 18).
These saddle points and poles play a different interpretive function in the mathematical
theory. Saddle points correspond to rays which appear more sharply as the ratio between
the raindrop radius and the wavelength increases. On the other hand, poles correspond
to waves, pointing to the importance of diffraction (Pincock 2011, p. 19). This, what
Pincock refers to as an ‘interpretive conjecture,’ is what allows us to plainly see what the
overall scattering process corresponding to supernumeraries depends on.
This brings us to the question: What role does the ray model play in explaining the
supernumeraries? No doubt, the ray fiction plays an important role in isolating which
explanation variables crucially explain the explanandum (Batterman 2005; Pincock 2011;
Saatsi forthcoming). Without the light ray model, we would not be able to see the
fundamental difference makers in the sea of Mie computations. However, does this role
go beyond model-induced explanation (MIE)?
Pincock describes the ray model as playing a largely interpretive function (2011, p. 19):
A scientist must ascend from the wave theory to the ray representation before she
is able to get the ‘physical insight’ into the supernumeraries which CAM provides.
This does not mean that she must believe the ray theory is correct. Instead she
must use the results of one idealization to inform the proper interpretation of another
idealization.
The ray model allows us to gain an understandable interpretation of the physical
behavior of light in the context of other idealizing assumptions (e.g., the introduction to
the limit). Saatsi shares Pincock’s interpretation that the light ray fiction is an interpretive
exercise. He says of CAM’s improvement that (forthcoming, p. 12, original italics):
This improvement is not a matter of introducing new variables that ontologically
transcend the Lorenz-Mie theory (cf. Pincock 2011). Nor is it a matter of provid-
ing more fine-grained information about the explanatory dependence. Rather the
improvement has to do with the way in which the CAM approach defines critical
explanation variables upon which the explanandum depends in a simple way.
On this interpretation, the propositions of the fictitious ray model are not part of
the explanation that explain supernumeraries. Instead, it is an interpretive frame for
understanding certain behavioral and mathematical realities of light explained in terms
of other concepts (e.g., saddle points). Thus, the ray model plays an interpretive epistemic
role in understanding how key concepts relate in an explanation, but it is not a core aspect
of the explanation itself. The variables in the explanation without this interpretive gloss
would still do the same explanatory work. The light ray model extracts how we should
think about the explanation variables, but it is not identical to any part of the explanation.
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The “association between the saddle points and rays lets us appreciate how the light
behaves in some respects as the ray theory would predict” (2011, p. 19), in a way that
furthers an epistemic aim, such as understanding, but is not part of the explanation in
any proper sense. Thus, the ray model plays a genesis function characteristic of MIE, not
of ME.
Batterman (2005), on the other hand, takes the ray model to be setting the boundary
conditions of the explanation. This is more promising for ME. If the ray model is part of
the boundary conditions, then perhaps this is enough to be an instance of ME. Batterman
says (2005, p. 159):
In order to see what boundary conditions to impose on the partial differential equa-
tion in the first place, we must conceptualize the problem as one in which (to a first
approximation) we are considering specular reflection off the back of the raindrop.
It involves, that is, thinking about light behaving as rays on the physical bound-
aries. Without the physical interpretation to begin with, we would not know what
boundary conditions to join to the differential equation. Neither, would we know
how to join those boundary conditions to the equation. Put another way, we must
examine the physical details of the boundaries (the shape, reflective and refractive
details of the drops, etc.) in order to set up the boundary conditions required for
the mathematical solution to the equation.
Notice though that Batterman does not go so far to say that the ray model is part of
the explanation. On the contrary, the ray model is ‘setting up’ what is needed to solve
the equation and generate the explanation. It is not the propositions of the fictitious
ray model that are part of the explanation. The model gives us a physical interpretation
to extract the necessary boundary conditions that later figure into the explanation (i.e.,
the shape and size of the raindrops and their reflective details). So again, we fall short
of ME. The fiction is the genesis of explanatory information, namely picking out what
information is explanatorily relevant, but the fictitious model is no way identical to the
explanation, even in our restricted sense.
Batterman’s interpretation is different from Pincock’s and Saatsi’s. For Pincock and
Saatsi, the interpretive role the ray model plays seems largely secondary to the the math-
ematical model, as a step to improve understanding. Whereas on Batterman’s view, the
ray model uncovers the boundary conditions for the start of a possible explanation. How-
ever, in both cases, the resulting explanation utilizing the ray model is an instance of
MIE, not an instance of ME.
3.4. Upshot of the Survey
The result of our survey of paradigmatic alleged ME is that all of them turn out to be
MIE. In each case, the relevant explanatory information is independent of the model but
only closely intertwined with the model due to the history of obtaining the information.
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In the honey bee case, it is the information that the honey bees seem to maximize their
energy efficiency rather than the rate of energy intake. In the fluid flow case, we learn
which physical details are irrelevant and which ones are necessary for the phenomenon
of interest. In the rainbow case, working with the fiction of light rays provides us with
necessary boundary conditions (Batterman 2005) and an interpretive framework for a
mathematical theory (Pincock 2011).
The observation that the explanatory information is information independent of the
model is not limited to the examined cases. We chose them because they are paradigmatic
cases of alleged ME. What seems to be a model explanation turns out to be a model-
induced explanation. For instance, the optimality model of the eider duck’s foraging
behavior (Rice 2018) also at best provides us with MIE, but not with ME. We expect to
get similar results for other alleged cases of ME. If so, we don’t have a case of ME yet. As
we argue in the next section, this suggests that what is special about models in science is
how they induce explanations.
4. Are Model Explanations Special?
So far, we have argued that there are two different conceptions of explanations using
models. Model-induced explanations are explanations where constructing or using the
model constitutes a decisive part of arriving at the explanation. Model explanations are
explanations where the model’s core content is identical to the core of the explanation.
In this section, we argue that both are not special from an explanatory point of view.
Although it is a special characteristic of model(-induced) explanations that they are
closely related to a model, this does not necessarily render such explanations special qua
explanation. ME can simply be instances of more general kinds of explanation. For in-
stance, Bokulich prominently introduces a taxonomy of model explanations that reflect
familiar kinds of explanation (2011, sec. 2 & 3): According to her, mechanistic model
explanations are particular mechanistic explanations, namely descriptions of mechanisms
based on a model. Covering-law model explanations are particular covering-law explana-
tions, namely explanations which, inter alia, cite model-based laws in their explanantia.
Causal model explanations are particular causal explanations, namely explanations where
one explains observed features by postulating underlying structures whose features are
causally responsible for the properties. Structural model explanations are particular non-
causal explanations, namely explanations where the explanandum-phenomenon is shown
to be a consequence of particular structural features of the theories employed in the
model.26 Importantly, in none of these cases is the model aspect of the explanation doing
26The more precise definitions of these kinds of model-based explanations are not important here and we
also do not discuss the taxonomy’s adequacy. For criticisms of Bokulich’s account of structural model
explanations, see, e.g., King 2016.
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much work. On the contrary, it is the causal, law-covering or structural aspect that makes
the explanation a ‘special’ kind of explanation demanding its own treatment.
Moreover, without loss, this taxonomy could be also used as a taxonomy of model-
induced explanation. All the categories apply equally well to MIE. For instance, the
model-based law, or non-accidental regularity, could be the one that is discovered by
working a model, such as the regularity that honey bees tend to maximize their energy
efficiency rather their energy intake. So again, there is nothing about the role of models
that makes the explanation qua explanation special or different.
At the very least, it seems that in order to show that an explanation constitutes a
new kind of explanation one needs to show that either a unique kind of why- or how-
question is being asked, or that there is a fundamentally different way to answer why-
or how-questions. However, our interlocutors have not given us that much. Instead, we
suggest that what philosophers of science take to be interesting about the models that
we discussed is actually the epistemology behind how models help produce explanations.
MIE explanations are obtained in close relationship with working with a model. Models
figure in the process of obtaining the explanation and they might even be required in that
process. Without the model we might not arrive at the explanations, because we lack the
crucial epistemic access to the desired information. For instance, Marchionni emphasizes
that the models she examines crucially depend (2017, p. 606, our italics):
[...] on assumptions known to be false [...] such assumptions are indispensable for
the derivation of the results.
We think that such features make explanations with the aid of models unique. But it
is important to not conflate the special features of the discovery of an explanation with
the features of the explanation itself. For instance, special features of the discovery of
laws are not special features of explanations using these laws.
The distinction between the explanation and how we arrive at it has implications for
not only our taxonomies of explanations, but also for larger debates about the nature of
explanation and scientific practice, especially the factivity debate as we briefly discuss
below. Thus, it is important that we no longer conflate model explanation with model-
induced explanation.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we argued that there are two substantially different conceptions of model
explanation, which should not be conflated, but often are: model explanation and model-
induced explanation. We argued that model explanations are best understood in terms
of an identity relation between the explanation’s core and the core of the respective
model’s content (ME Core). By contrast, model-induced explanations (MIE) only feature
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explanantia that have been obtained by working with a model. We further argued that
paradigmatic cases of alleged ME do not fulfill the criteria for ME; instead they turn
out to be MIE. It seems that philosophers of science have taken up an interest, not with
model explanation, as they claim, but with model-induced explanation. The special or
interesting aspects of these explanations with models is due to the epistemic discovery
behind the explanations—that is how models induce, enable, or generate explanations—
not the properties of the explanations themselves. Thus, philosophers need to reconsider
the unique way that models explain. Our notion of ME Core suggests thinking through
what the central notions of a model are and how they provide explanatory power as a
way forward.
Lastly, we also expect that, in light of our results, the argument for the anti-factivity
of scientific explanation loses much of its force. The anti-factivity debate is driven by two
fundamental assumptions: (i) that explanations with models are ME, and (ii) that at least
some explanations with models involve the idealizations stipulated by the model. In this
paper, we substantially undermined (i). The survey of the paradigmatic cases of alleged
ME shows that they are really cases of MIE. We have also called into question (ii). In
none of the cases of idealizations that we discussed are the idealizations themselves part
of the respective explanantia. However, we stopped short of offering a decisive argument
against the possibility of (ii). Whether there are explanations that include idealizations
stipulated by a model demands a closer look (for arguments against (ii), see, e.g., Lawler
2019; Rice 2019b).
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